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ABSTRACT 
As a fundamental cryptographic tool, (t,n)-threshold secret sharing ((t,n)-SS) divides a secret among n shareholders and requires at least 
t, (t<=n), of them to reconstruct the secret. Ideal (t,n)-SSs are most desirable in security and efficiency among basic (t,n)-SSs. However, an 
adversary, even without any valid share, may mount Illegal Participant (IP) attack or t/2-Private Channel Cracking (t/2-PCC) attack to 
obtain the secret in most (t,n)-SSs.To secure ideal (t,n)-SSs against the 2 attacks, 1) the paper introduces the notion of Ideal Tightly cOupled 
(t,m,n) Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-ITOSS ) to thwart IP attack without Verifiable SS; (t,m,n)-ITOSS binds all m, (m>=t), participants into 
a tightly coupled group and requires all participants to be legal shareholders before recovering the secret. 2) As an example, the paper 
presents a polynomial-based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme, in which the proposed k-round Random Number Selection (RNS) guarantees that 
adversaries have to crack at least é ù2/m symmetrical private channels among participants before obtaining the secret. Therefore, k-round 
RNS enhances the robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost. 3) The paper finally presents a generalized method 
of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS, which helps an ideal (t,n)-SS substantially improve the robustness against the above 
2 attacks.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Ideal (t,n)-Threshold Secret Sharing 
As a cryptographic building block, the first (t,n) threshold secret sharing (or (t,n)-SS) scheme was introduced independently by Shamir 
[23] and Blakley [2] in 1979. A ),( nt -SS scheme divides a secret into n shares and allocates each share to one shareholder such that 1) t or 
more than t shareholders are able to reconstruct the secret but 2) fewer than t shareholders can’t. Besides the above 2 schemes, there are 
other ones such as Massey’s linear code based scheme [20], Mignotte’s [22] and Asmuth-Bloom’s [1] Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) 
based schemes. (t,n)-SS is widely used in many applications such as group signature [2, 10], group authentication [12, 16], threshold 
encryption [7], secure multi-party computation [6] etc. Today, SS is still studied in many aspects [24, 9, 4]. 
As the most popular SS scheme, Shamir’s (t,n)-SS scheme [23] is based on a polynomial of degree 1-t  over a finite field, in which the 
dealer computes n values of the polynomial and sends each value to a shareholder privately as the share. According to Lagrange 
interpolation, t or more than t shareholders can reconstruct the polynomial and thus obtain the secret, which is also a value of the polynomial. 
However, less than t shareholders can’t recover the secret.  
In 1989, Brickell [8] defined that a SS is ideal if 1) an unqualified group of shareholders gets no information about the secret and 2) the 
share space has the same size as the secret space. An ideal SS has the perfect probability distribution of the secret and the highest efficiency 
of secret sharing in term of share size. Therefore, ideal (t,n)-SSs are most desirable among (t,n)-SSs in both security and efficiency. Both 
Shamir’s [23] and Massey’s [20] schemes are ideal; moreover, Blakley’s scheme can also be modified into an ideal scheme [8]. However, 
Mignotte’s [22] and Asmuth-Bloom’s [1] schemes are not ideal because both share spaces are always larger than their respective secret 
spaces in size. 
1.2 Two Attacks against (t,n)-SSs 
In (t,n)-SSs, shareholders are often called participants when they participate in secret reconstruction and there usually exists a symmetric 
private channel (or SPC) between any 2 shareholders (e.g., a pair of shareholders set up a SPC by some key agreement protocol). Usually 
assumed to be absolutely secure in most (t,n)-SSs, a SPC enables a pair of shareholders to exchange shares privately. During secret 
reconstruction, each participant delivers its share privately to the others through corresponding SPCs, and can recover the secret when at 
least t shares are available.  
However, an adversary without any valid share (or Outsider), could compromise (t,n)-SSs in the following 2 cases. 
1) If the Outsider manages to join the secret reconstruction as one of m (m>t) participants, it can obtain the secret by collecting up to t 
shares from the others. We name it Illegal Participant (or IP) attack.  
2) In extreme cases, the Outsider may crack a SPC. That is, the Outsider may figure out the SPC key or intercept the shares through the 
SPC in some way. If the Outsider could crack é ù2/t SPCs, no matter how many participants exist in the secret reconstruction, it may obtain 
up to t shares by intercepting these cracked SPCs and thus recover the secret. We simply call it t/2-Private Channel Cracking (or t/2-PCC) 
attack.  
The paper focuses on how to simultaneously address the 2 attacks in an ideal (t,n)-SS to prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret. 
1.3 Related Work 
In order to prevent an Outsider from participating in the secret reconstruction (IP attack), Chor et al. [5] proposed the notion of verifiable 
secret sharing (VSS) in 1985. VSS enables a shareholder to prove that its share is valid without revealing it. There are many papers on VSS 
[11, 15, 26, 27] in the literature. Although VSS can be used to check the validity of each share; but it is very complicated and requires 
additional information to enable verification, it means a VSS scheme may not be ideal. Moreover, an Outsider may obtain the secret if it 
could directly cracks é ù2/t  SPCs among participants.  
To prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret without VSS, Harn [13] proposed a secure secret reconstruction scheme based on 
Shamir’s (t,n)-SS in 2013. In the scheme, the dealer chooses k (k>=2) polynomials over a finite field and generates k shares for each 
shareholder. Each polynomial includes a sub-secret, and the secret is a linear combination of the k sub-secrets. Before m (m>=t) 
shareholders recover the secret, each participant constructs a Lagrange component, which is also the linear combination of its k shares. The 
secret is recovered by summing up all m Lagrange components. The scheme is simpler than VSSs in preventing IP attack. However, it 
requires each participant to hold k shares and the parameter k is restricted by the threshold t and the total number of shareholders n, thus it 
is not flexible enough. Miao et al. [21] improved Harn’s scheme by using randomized components instead of multiple polynomials, which 
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allows each shareholder to have only one share and is more flexible than Harn’s scheme. Both schemes guarantee that an Outsider has to 
break at least é ù2/m  SPCs to recover the secret, where m, the number of participants, could be much larger than the threshold t and é ù2/m
is apparently the maximum lower bound. Nevertheless, both schemes are not ideal because the share(s) each shareholder has is several 
times larger than the secret in size.  
Currently, the following 2 methods, complete shuffling and partial shuffling, can be used to improve the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS 
against t/2-PCC attack and defeat IP attack. 
In order to provide authentication service in ad hoc networks, Kong, Luo and Lu et al. [18, 19] presented a secret sharing based certificate 
service. Substantially, it utilizes the complete shuffling algorithm to protect initial shares during new share generation. In the complete 
shuffling algorithm, each pair of participants exchanges a shuffling factor, and each participant finally gets m-1 shuffling factors in total if 
there are m participants. A participant protects its share by constructing a shuffled partial share with the m-1shuffling factors. All m shuffled 
partial shares are required during the generation of a new share; they also protect m participants’ shares during the new share generation. 
As proved in [17], a share is actually equivalent to a secret, thus new share generation in a (t, n)-SS can be viewed as the procedure of 
secret reconstruction. If we apply the complete shuffling algorithm to an ideal (t,n)-SS with SPCs, an Outsider has to crack at least é ù2/m  
SPCs to obtain all m shuffled partial shares before figuring out the secret. 
There are totally 2/)1( -mm  shuffling factors exchanged in the algorithm, which works well if m is a small number. However, it is not 
efficient in communication for most (t, n)-SSs in which m  may be a large number. Thus Zhang et al. [28] proposed a partial shuffling 
algorithm, m participants in the algorithm form a loop according to the order of subscripts, each participants just picks one random number 
as its shuffling factor, sends it to the following participant and constructs its shuffled partial share with the share, the shuffling factor and 
the preceding participant’s shuffling factor. All m shuffled partial shares are also required to reconstruct the secret. 
Although only m shuffling factors need to be exchanged in the partial shuffling algorithm[28], Nevertheless, if we apply the partial 
shuffling algorithm to an ideal (t,n)-SS with SPCs among participants, it is possible for an Outsider to obtain the secret merely by cracking 
min{ é ù2/m , 1+t } SPCs. That is because the Outsider can recover the secret in either of the 2 cases, 1) intercepting all m shuffled partial 
shares after cracking at least é ù2/m SPCs, 2) obtaining t shares after cracking continuous t+1 SPCs. That is, the partial shuffling algorithm 
improves the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack at most 2 times no matter how large m is. 
Therefore, it is necessary to shuffle shares at a low communication cost such that an Outsider has to crack at least é ù2/m SPCs before 
obtaining the secret. 
1.4 Contributions 
In order to prevent an adversary without any valid share from obtaining the secret,  the paper focuses on how to thwart IP attack and 
improve the robustness against t/2-PCC attack simultaneously in an ideal (t,n)-SS.  
To attain this goal, we will first present the notion of ideal tightly coupled (t,m,n) secret sharing ( or (t,m,n)-ITOSS) to thwart IP attack, 
(t,m,n)-ITOSS requires all m (m>=t) participants, instead of only part of them, to have valid shares before recovering the secret. Then, we 
will present the k-round Random Number Selection algorithm to associate secret reconstruction with enough SPCs to enhance the 
robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost.  
The main contributions of the paper include 1) the formal definition of (t,m,n)-ITOSS, 2) an polynomial-based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme 
with k-round Random Number Selection (RNS) algorithm and 3) a generalized method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 gives some preliminaries and section 3 formally defines the ideal tightly coupled 
(t,m,n) secret sharing scheme; as an example, a polynomial based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme is proposed in section 4, security analyses and 
properties are presented respectively in section 5 and section 6. Section 7 generalized the method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a 
(t,m,n)-ITOSS and section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
2.1 Notations 
The notations in table 1 will be used throughout the paper. 
Table 1. Notations frequently used in the paper 
Notations Descriptions 
F  a finite field; 
nI , mI  
:nI subscript set {0,1,…,n-1}; 
:mI subset of nI with m elements; 
U ,
mIU  
:U set of n shareholders; 
:
mIU subset of U with m participants; 
S , iS  :S secret space; :iS share space; 
pF  the Finite field{0,1,…,p-1}, p a prime; 
Ω ,
mIΩ  
:Ω set of n shares;  
:Ω mI subset of Ω with m shares; 
jU  the thj  shareholder (or participant); 
js  the share of jU ; 
jc  the Randomized Component (RC) of jU ; 
mIC  the RC set of mIU ; 
jr  the private random number of jU ; 
pRj Fr Î  jr is uniformly selected over pF ; 
t  the threshold;  
 
2.2 Some definitions 
Now we need to introduce some basic terms in information theory, suppose X  and Y  are discrete-time discrete valued random 
variables with respective sample spaces 1SP and 2SP . The entropy of X is denoted by ,)(log)())(log()( 1 22 å -=-= ÎSPx xPxPXPEXH and the mean 
mutual information of X with respect to Y  is denoted by ,
)()(
)(log)()|()();(
21;
2 yPxP
xyPxyPYXHXHYXI
yx
å=-=
ÎÎ SPSP
where (.)E is the expectation 
operator and (.)P  is a probability distribution function. In the following sections, we will write )(log2 xP  as )(log xP for simplicity. 
 
Definition 1.  ((t,n)-SS) 
Let F be a finite field, S and iS denote the secret space and share space respectively; a (t,n)-Threshold Secret Sharing ((t,n)-SS) scheme 
is a pair of algorithms },{ SRSG : 
Share Generation algorithm -- ),( UsSG takes as input a secret SÎs and a group of n shareholders },,|{ njj IjUU ÎÎ= FU where },1,...,1,0{ -nIn =
jU is the public information (or identity) of the thj  shareholder. The algorithm generates a set of n  shares },),(|{Ω nijjj IjUsfss ÎÎ== S  as 
output, where if SFS ®´: is the share generation function.  
Secret Reconstruction algorithm-- ),Ω( mm IISR U takes as input any subset of shares },Ω|{Ω mjjI Ijssm ÎÎ= as well as the corresponding 
shareholder set },|{ mjjI IjUUm ÎÎ= UU  and produces the secret s as output, where ,||, tmInII mnm ³=³Í || mI  is the cardinality of mI . 
Shareholders in mIU are called participants when they participate in secret reconstruction. 
 
Definition 2.  (Ideal (t,n)-SS) 
A ),( nt -SS scheme )},Ω(),,({ mm IISRsSG UU is ideal if it satisfies the following 3 requirements: 
1) The secret s  can be recovered from t or more than t  shares. Formally, any group of )( tmnm ³³  participants, ,mIU  with m  
corresponding shares ,Ω mI can reconstruct the secret ,s i.e. 0)Ω|( =mIsH holds if s is viewed as a random variable in .S  
2) Compared to an adversary without any valid share, a subset of less than t participants, ,dIU does not have any additional information 
about the secret, i.e. ,0)()|( ³=W sHsH dI where dIW is the corresponding share set of dIU with },,|{ djjI Ijssd ÎWÎ=W .||, tIII dnd <Í  
3) The share space and the secret space are of the same size, i.e. .log|log 22 ||| i SS =  
 
Remark: A (t,n)-secret sharing scheme satisfying 1) and 2) is perfect with respect to the set of probability distributions in the secret space
S . That is, the secret s can be viewed as a random variable uniformly distributed over S . 
 
3. DEFINITION OF IDEAL TIGHTLY COUPLED (T,M,N)-SECRET SHARING 
Informally, a (t,n)-SS is tightly coupled if it further meets the following requirements, for a group of )( tmnm ³³ participants, 1) the 
secret can be recovered only if all m participants necessarily possess a valid share each and actually participate in the secret reconstruction; 
2) any adversary, not belonging to the group, cannot figure out the secret within the group even if it is a legal shareholder. 
 
Definition 3.  ((t,m,n)-ITOSS) 
Let F  be a finite field, S  and iS  denote respectively the secret space and share space with | S |=| iS |. An Ideal Tightly Coupled (t,m,n)-
Secret Sharing  (or (t,m,n)-ITOSS) scheme is a group of algorithms {SG, RCC, RCSR}: 
 
Share Generation algorithm-- ),( UsSG  takes as input a secret SÎs as well as a group of n  shareholders },,|{ njj IjUU ÎÎ= FU  and 
generates as output a set of n  shares },),(|{Ω nijjj IjUsfss ÎÎ== S , where if SFS ®´:  is the share generation function.   
Randomized Component Construction algorithm-- ),( mm IIRCC UW  takes any share set },|{ mijjI Ijssm ÎÎ=W S  and the corresponding 
shareholder set },|{ mjjI IjUUm ÎÎ= UU  as input and produces a set },),,(|{ mjIjjjI Ijrsgcc mm ÎÎ== FUC as output, where nm II Í , nmIt m £=£ || ,
:g FUS ´´ )(subi à F  is a function, )( FRjj rr Î , a random number, is uniformly selected by jU in F  and )(Usub  denotes the space of subsets 
of U . 
Here we name ),,( jIjj rsgc mU= the Randomized Component (or RC) of jU , which serves 2 functions: 1) binding the share js  with all 
participants mIU by introducing the private random number jr ; 2) protecting the share from exposure during secret reconstruction. We will 
demonstrate the 2 functions in the proposed scheme. 
RC based Secret Reconstruction algorithm-- )( mIRCSR C takes the above RC set mIC as input and produces the secret s as output. 
Furthermore, the (t,m,n)-ITOSS, { ),( UsSG , ),( mm IIRCC UW , )( mIRCSR C }, possesses the following 2 properties: 
1) Tightly Coupled Perfectness 
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where 'C  is the RC set actually used in recovering the secret s  with F¹Ç mICC ' . 
2) Equal Size 
The share space and the secret space have the same size, i.e. .log|log 22 ||| i SS =  
 
Remark: A (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme must be perfect. We use 'C  to denote a RC set which shares at least one RC with
mIC . As indicated by 
(1), the secret s can be recovered by 'C only if 'C is identical with 
mIC which consists of all )( tmm ³ valid RCs. That is, the secret can be 
reconstructed only if all m participants necessarily have valid shares to construct RCs and actually join the secrete reconstruction. Otherwise, 
even if one RC in 
mIC remains unknown, no additional information about the secret can be obtained from 'C . In this sense, we say that the 
m participants form a tightly coupled group or they are tightly coupled. 
4. PROPOSED (T,M,N)-ITOSS SCHEME  
Actually, Definition 3 has described the framework of (t,m,n)-ITOSS. As an instance, we will put forward a concrete (t,m,n)-ITOSS 
scheme based on Shamir’s (t,n)-SS to prevent IP attack in a simple way. In the scheme, we will also propose a Random Number Selection 
algorithm based on Euler’s totient function, and then use the algorithm to improve the robustness against t/2-PCC attack. In fact, (t,m,n)-
ITOSS schemes can also be constructed based on other ideal (t,n)-SSs, e.g. linear code or hyperplane based ideal (t,n)-SSs. 
4.1 System Model 
4.1.1 Entities and Communication Model 
Similar to most (t,n)-SSs, there are 2 types of entities, 1 dealer and n shareholders, in the proposed scheme. 
Dealer: The dealer is the coordinator trusted by all shareholders, and is responsible for the initialization of the scheme such as deciding 
system parameters, choosing the secret, generating and distributing shares and so on. The dealer is supposed to be honest, which means 
that it selects parameters to make the scheme secure enough, keeps critical parameters private, generates valid shares and distributes them 
securely. 
Shareholders: In (t,m,n)-ITOSS, there are totally n  shareholders. Shareholders are called participants when they are participating in secret 
reconstruction.  
We assume that each shareholder receives the valid share from the dealer securely, since share distribution can be completed offline in 
advance. Besides, each pair of shareholders is supposed to have a symmetrical private channel (or SPC) between them, and thus both 
shareholders can exchange information over the SPC privately. However, a SPC is not absolutely secure in some extreme cases.  
Each shareholder receives a share from the dealer via the secure channel. To recover the secret, at least t  shareholders need to form a 
tightly coupled group; each of them generates a RC for the secret, releases it to the others privately through SPCs, and finally reconstructs 
the secret.  
A tightly coupled group of )( tmm ³ participants, },...,,{
)1(10 -
=
mm iiiI UUUU , can be described by an undirected complete graph ),( mmm III EUG = , 
where 
mIU , the group of m participants, denotes the set of vertices of mIG , mIE is the set of unordered pairs, i.e.,
}.,,|),{( kjIiiiiI iiUUUU mkjkjm ¹Î= UE  Each unordered pair ),( kj ii UU , denoting an edge of mIG , is actually the SPC between participant jiU and 
.kiU  (see Figure 1) 
 
4.1.2 Adversary Model 
Aiming to prevent adversaries without valid shares from obtaining the secret in an ideal (t,n)-SS, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS mainly 
consider the adversary Outsider, which has no valid share. 
For a group of m shareholders (i.e., participants) in a certain secret reconstruction, Outsiders have the following capability: 
1) All Outsiders probably crack some, but not all, SPCs among m (m>=t) participants and eavesdrop all plaintexts of messages through 
these cracked SPCs.  (see Figure 1) 
2) An Outsider may disguise itself as a participant (but without a valid share) in some way, set up SPCs with m-1 shareholders to form a 
group of m participants and receive messages from the others. 
3) An Outsider cannot obtain the share directly from inside a shareholder. Otherwise, it can impersonate the compromised shareholder. 
4) In order to obtain the authentic secret, Outsiders don’t send messages containing a fake share to participants in secret reconstruction. 
Remark: The (t,m,n)-ITOSS aims to prevent an Outsider from obtaining the secret rather than to ensure recovering the correct secret. 
Therefore, we assume that all shareholders would rather give up secret reconstruction than leak the secret to Outsiders, because safeguarding 
the secret is of the first importance in secret sharing schemes. That is why we assume 4) is true, because releasing a fake share does not 
help an Outsider obtain the secret. 
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4.2 Random Number Selection (RNS) Algorithm 
In a (t,m,n)-ITOSS, all participants form a tightly coupled group by constructing a Randomized Component each to thwart IP and t/2-
PCC attacks. Before generating RCs, all m participants need to run the following k-round RNS algorithm collectively to choose a private 
random number each. To enhance the robustness against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost, RNS employs Euler’s totient function to associate 
a proper number of SPCs with the selection of each private random number. A k-round RNS algorithm comes as follows. 
Let )(mj denote the Euler’s totient function of positive integer ,m  and thus there are 2/)(mj numbers relatively prime tom  and less than
,2/m  i.e., },...,,1{ 2/)(21 mm ddd j==D , an increasing sequence. Assume that there are )( tmm ³  participants, e.g., },...,,{ 110 -= mm UUUU , (to make it 
Figure 1. An example of symmetrical private channels (SPCs) among 5 participants (with an adversary) Figure 2. An example of 2-round RNS with 5 participants 
easy to describe, we just use participants with subscripts instead of sub-subscripts here), each participant mjU UÎ finally selects a private 
random number pj Fr Î as follows, where p is a large prime (see Figure 2 for example). 
1) In the first round, 0U picks and sends a number pR FwW Î= 1010 to 1U privately through the SPC. Here we use the superscript to denote the 
order of each round. 
2) 1U  uniformly picks ,11 pR Fw Î  computes and delivers pwwW mod)( 111011 +=  to 2U . 
3) Each participants, ,jU  ( 22 -££ mj ), selects pRj Fw Î1  and passes pwW jh hj mod0 11 å= = on to 1+jU  privately via the SPC. 
4) 1-mU  chooses pRm Fw Î-1 1  and delivers =-1 1mW pwW mm mod)( 1 11 2 -- + pwmh h mod10 1å= -=  back to 0U  in private. In the th1  round, starting from 0U
at the participants’ subscript interval ,11 =d each participant mjU UÎ  selects the first private number pj Fw Î1  . 
5) Similarly, in the thj  round ( 2/)(2 mkj j£££ ), each participant repeats the above procedure but at the subscript interval, .mjd DÎ  More 
specifically, 0U selects and passes pRjj FwW Î= 00 on to ,jdU  ( 1,1, ¹-¹Î jjmj dmdd D ). Similarly, jdU uniformly picks jd jw over pF and hands 
pwwW jd
jj
j
mod)( 01 += down to )mod2( md jU through the SPC; the process goes on at the subscript interval .jd That is, each participant ,)mod( mhd jU
,1,...,1,0 -= mh picks pRj mhd Fw j Î)mod( and passes pwW hi
jj
h mjid
mod0 )mod(å= = on to .)mod)1(( mdh jU + At last, 0U receives pwW mi
jj
m mjid
mod101 )mod(å=
-
=- from
.mod1 mdm jU ）（ -  Note that each round can proceed in parallel. 
6) Finally, 0U receives { kj|W jm ,...,2,11 =- } after k rounds. 0U chooses pR Fv Î0 such that .0mod)( 011 =+å -= pvW jmkj In this way, ),11(, -££ mjU j finally 
obtains a private random number pwr ki ijj mod1å= =  while 0U gets pwvr ki i mod)( 1 000 å+= = as the private random number. Note that 
0mod)...( 110 =+++ - prrr m holds for ir , i=0,1,…,m-1. 
Generally speaking, in order to improve the robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost but at a relatively low 
communication cost, the number of rounds ,k should be the least such that an adversary has to crack é ù2/m SPCs before obtaining the secret. 
The reason will be explained in theorem 5. 
 
Theorem 1. )6,4( ¹> mmm  participants can always obtain a private random number each by running a k-round RNS ( 2/)(2 mk j££ ), 
which covers km  distinct SPCs; 
Proof. Let us prove the theorem from the following 2 aspects, 1) the number of SPCs involved and 2) the privacy of each private random 
number. 
1）Number of involved SPCs  
In the first round, )6,4( ¹> mmm participants, i.e., },,...,,{ 110 -mUUU form the loop, ,...,210 UUU ®® ,01 UUm ®® - containing m SPCs, to obtain 
the first number each, e.g., jU gets ,1 pRj Fw Î for .10 -££ mj Generally, in the thh )1( kh ££ round, they follow the path, ,...,mod20 mdd hh UUU ®®
®® + ,...,mod)1(mod mdimid hh UU ,0mod1 UU mdm h ®-）（ )10( -££ mi , also including m  private channels, to choose the thh number each. e.g., jU picks
,pRhj Fw Î  for .10 -££ mj As a result, there are totally km  SPCs involved in k  rounds. 
Now let us prove the km  SPCs are distinct from one another. 
In any 2 out of k rounds, e.g. the thg  and the thh  round )( hg ¹ , each participant, ,jU ),10( -££ mj shares different SPCs with its neighbor 
participants. Specifically, in the thg  round, each pair of neighbor participants has the subscript interval of ,gd and thus the sequence of 
subscripts, }mod)1(,...,mod2,,0{ mdmmdd ggg - , forms a permutation of {0,1,2,…,m-1} due to 1),gcd( =mdg . Similarly, in the thh round, the 
sequence of participant subscripts, }mod)1(,...,mod2,,0{ mdmmdd hhh - is also a permutation of {0,1,2,…,m-1}. However, it is known from 
modular arithmetic that both permutations are distinct.  
Note that the SPC mdjj iUU mod)( +«  is the same as jmdmj UU k «-+ mod))1(( in the case of .mdd ki =+ For example, both 5mod)20(0 +«UU and
05mod)3*)15(0( UU «-+ in Figure 2 are the same SPC between 0U and 2U . However, mdd ki =+ means either id  or kd is larger than m/2, therefore, 
there is no duplicate SPC among all rounds because each interval value in },...,,1{ 2/)(21 mm ddd j==D  is less than m/2. 
As a result, there are totally kmdistinct SPCs involved in the k-round RNS ( 2/)(1 mk j££ ). 
2) Privacy of each random number 
In the first round, a participant, e.g. )0( mjU j <<  receives pwW jk kj mod10 11 1 å= -=- from the preceding participant 1-jU while delivers
pwW jk kj mod0 11 å= = to .mod)1( mjU + Note that pj Fw Î1 is randomly selected by jU and thus is a random variable uniformly distributed over pF for others, 
i.e. .log)( 1 pwH j =  Only knowing ,1 pj FW Î mjU mod)1( + can find any possible pj Fw Î1  and pj FW Î-1 1 such that pWwW jjj mod)( 1 111 -+= holds, i.e. 
.log)|( 11 pWwH jj =  Hence, mjU mod)1( + has ,0)|()();( 11111 =-= jjjjj WwHwHWwI  which means mjU mod)1( + obtains no information about 1jw from 1jW . Similarly, 
,mod)( mdj gU + the following participant of jU in the thg  round, also gets no information about 
g
jw from gjW , where pRgj Fw Î is the value selected 
by jU , ,2/)(1 mkg j£££ .mod0 pwW jh ghgj å= =  Therefore, pwr kg gjj mod1å= = is the private random number of )0( mjU j << in the k-round RNS. For 0U , 
pwvr kh h mod)( 1 000 å+= = is also private since pR Fv Î0 is never exposed to the outside.                                                             
As the special case of ,6=m },...,,{ 510 UUU can follow the 2 special paths, ®®® 210 UUU 0543 UUUU ®®® and
0351420 UUUUUUU ®®®®®® , to cover 122 =m SPCs and obtain a private random number each. However, if =m 2, 3 and 4, one cannot 
find 2 paths which share no SPCs.                                                                                 o  
  
4.3 (t,m,n)-ITOSS Scheme based on Shamir’s (t,n)-SS 
The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS aims to secure an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC and IP attacks so that it can efficiently prevent an Outsider 
from obtaining the secret. 
Assume that there are n shareholders, },,|{ npjj IjFUU ÎÎ=U  =nI {0,1,…,n-1}, )( ntt < is the threshold. The dealer D chooses a 
polynomial å= -=10 mod)( ti ii pxaxf in private, where )10( -££ tiai are uniformly selected in pF , 0)0( afs == is the secret to be shared and p is a 
large prime. According to Definition 3, (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme consists of the following 3 algorithms. 
1) Share Generation algorithm— )( Us,SG  
The dealer D generates the share pjj FUfs Î= )(  for each shareholder UÎjU and delivers js  to jU securely. As a result, the share set of U
is .}),(|{Ω pjjjj FUUfss ÍÎ== U  
2) Randomized Component Construction algorithm-- ),(
mm IIRCC UW  
If m  participants, ,,|{ nmjjI IIjUUm ÍÎÎ= UU  }|| tmIn m ³=³ , need to recover the secret ,s each participant mIjU UÎ  first runs the k-round 
RNS algorithm to obtain a private random number pj Fr Î , and then constructs a RC as prUUUsc jiIi jjiijj m mod})/({ ,Õ +-= ¹Î . The RC set of 
mIU is }.,mod))/((|{ , mjjijiIi ijjjI IjprUUUscc mm Î+-Õ== ¹ÎC  
3) RC based Secret Reconstruction algorithm -- )( mIRCSR C  
Each participant 
mIjU UÎ deliveries jc privately to the others through SPCs. On obtaining all m RCs, i.e. mIC , each participant recovers 
the secret as  
                                pcpcs mmIj Ij jc j modmod å=å= ÎÎC                                      (2). 
Due to pc
mIj j modå Î ))/(( ,å +-Õ= Î ¹Îm mIj jjijiIi ij rUUUs pmod prf mIj j mod))0(( å+= Î pf mod)0)0(( += s= , the secret can be recovered by (2). 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSES 
In this section, we first prove the function of RC in protecting the share by Theorem 2, and then prove that the proposed scheme is tightly 
coupled and ideal in Theorem 3 and 4 respectively, which means (t,m,n)-ITOSS is secure against IP attack. Next, the robustness against 
t/2-PCC attack is demonstrated in Theorem 5. Finally, the security against (t-1) conspiring shareholders is given by Theorem 6. 
  
LEMMA 1. If )1,...,2,1,0( -= tja j  are )( ptt <  random variables uniformly and independently distributed over finite field pF , then 
paktj jj mod0å =  is also uniformly distributed over ,pF  where p  is a large prime number, )1,...,2,1,0( -= tjk j  are constants in pF  and not 
all jk  equals 0. 
Proof. (omitted) It is easy to prove by properties of finite field. o  
  
LEMMA 2.  In the k-round RNS, each participant jU  finally gets a private random number jr uniformly distributed over .pF   
 
Theorem 2.  Given a RC in the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS, an Outsider obtains no information about the contained share. Formally, given 
prUUUsc jjijiIi ijj m mod})/({ , +-Õ= ¹Î for mIjÎ , an adversary has .0);( =jj csI  
Proof.  Without the loss of generality, let take the share ,mod)(mod)( 10 pUapUfs ti ijijj å== -= )( mIjÎ for example. 
On one hand, for an Outsider, ia , (i=1,2,…,t-1), are variables uniformly distributed in ,pF and thus js is a random variable uniformly 
distributed over pF from Lemma 1. It means the probability of js  equal to any value in pF  is uniformly ./1 p  i.e. ),( jsH  the entropy of the 
share js , is .log p  
On the other hand, prUUUsc jjijiIi ijj m mod})/({ , +-Õ= ¹Î is followed by 
  prcUUUs jjjijiIi ij m mod)())/((
1
, --Õ=
-
¹Î                  (3). 
Obviously, pUUU jijiIi im mod))/( 1, -¹Î -Õ  is a constant for ,mIU  given jc  in (3), there is a distinct share js for each different jr . It is known 
from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 that jr  is uniformly distributed over pF for an adversary. In this case, there are totally p possible values of
js , each with the same probability p/1 . Therefore, the entropy .log)|( pcsH jj =  Consequently, an adversary has .0)|()();( =-= jjjjj csHsHcsI o                           
 
Theorem 2 implies that the RC jc is capable of protecting the share js from exposure; besides, the proposed scheme suggests that RCs also 
serve the function of recovering the secret.             
In the following, we use Theorem 3 to prove the security of the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS against IP attack.  
 
Theorem 3. The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme is tightly coupled. Formally, if F¹mICC' ! and F¹- C'C mI hold, then 0);( =C'sI follows for 
an Outsider, where C' is a RC set used by an Outsider to recover the secret swhile 
mIC is the correct RC set generated by m  legal 
participants for recovering .s F¹-C'C mI means there exists at least one RC in mIC but not in C' . 
Proof. Provide that UU ÍÎ= }|{ mjI IjUm , )( m||Im = is the tightly coupled group of m participants, with the RC set 
}.,mod))/((|{ , mjjkjkIk kjjjI IjprUUUscc mm Î+-Õ== ¹ÎC Note that the secret s is uniformly selected from pF  in private by the dealer, and thus, for 
the Outsider, is virtually a random variable uniformly distributed over .pF Therefore, an Outsider has psH log)( = . To prove 0);( =C'sI , we 
need to further find out )|( C'sH . 
Let )(xP be the probability density function of a random variable x and pcs jc j mod' 'å= ÎC be a value computed from C' . In this case, the 
probability to recover the secret s from C' is equivalent to ).'( ssP =  'ss = means ,modmod ' pcpc jmIj c jc j å=å ÎÎ CC i.e.  
    0mod' =å -Î pcmIjc jCC                                 (4). 
Recall that )( jj Ufs = pUa ijti i mod)(10å= -= and prUUUsc jjkjkIk kjj m mod))/(( , +-Õ= ¹Î , where jU is the public identity and jr is a private random 
number uniformly distributed over .pF  For an Outsider, ia (i=1,2,…,t-1) are unknown and uniformly selected within ,pF  i.e. they are 
virtually random variables uniformly distributed over .pF As a result, js has a uniform distribution over pF according to Lemma 1. Thus both
jc  and )mod( ' pcmIjc jå -Î CC are also uniformly distributed in pF  since )mod( ' pcmIjc jå -Î CC includes at least one RC in mIC , unknown to the 
Outsider. It follows that the probability of (4) is ,/1 p  i.e. == )'( ssP )|( C'sP = ,/1 p  where )|( C'sP  is the probability density function of 𝑠 
with the knowledge of .C'  As a result, an Outsider has )|()();( C'C' sHsHsI -= .0loglog =-= pp                                     o                                                                              
Theorem 3 means that, if C' , including at least one but not all RCs in
mIC , is used to recover the secret, no information about the secret 
can be obtained. In other words, recovering the secret requires each participant to have a valid share and actually release a valid RC. 
Theorem 3 apparently conforms to the tightly coupled perfectness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS defined by (1), it also demonstrates the security of 
(t,m,n)-ITOSS against IP attack.  
 
Theorem 4. The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS is ideal. 
Proof.  In the proposed scheme, RCs, instead of shares, are used to recover the secret. Thus it is natural for us to examine the property of 
being ideal in terms of RCs rather than shares.  
It is obvious that 1) The secret has the same range pF  with RCs, i.e. the secret space and the RC space are of the same size; 2) Theorem 
3 indicates that no additional information about the secret can be obtained from an unqualified RC set, .C' Therefore, the proposed scheme 
is ideal.                                                                                                      o  
 
Theorem 5.  In (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme with k-round RNS, if )(/ mmt j³ , there must exist an integer k ),2/)(1( mk j££  such that Outsiders 
have to crack at least é ù2/m SPCs before obtaining the secret in t/2-PCC attack. Otherwise, no additional information about the secret can 
be acquired. 
Proof.  Outsiders are adversaries without any valid share in (t,m,n)-ITOSS. In order to recover the secret, they have to acquire either all
m RCs or at least t shares. Otherwise, no extra information can be obtained. 
1) To acquire at least t shares 
Suppose =mD },,...,,1{ 2/)(21 mddd j= is the increasing sequence of integers relatively prime to m and less than ,/m 2 and mIU is the set of m  
participants, e.g. },...,,{ 110 -= mI UUUmU  for simplicity, where }.1,...,1,0{ -= mIm  
A ),,( nmt -ITOSS scheme employs RCs, instead of shares, to recover the secret. However, each RC, prUUUsc jjkjkIk kjj m mod})/({ , +-Õ= ¹Î , 
mIjÎ , contains a share js , once Outsiders get jc and the private random number jr by cracking SPCs, they can easily acquire the share js . 
In the k-round RNS, each participant ,jU ),11( -££ mj has the private random number pwr ki ijj mod1å= = , where pRij Fw Î  is the random 
integer picked by jU in the thi  round )2/)(1( mki j£££ . To finally obtain ,jr  Outsiders have to simultaneously crack in each round the 
preceding and the following SPCs of jU , i.e. jmdj UU i «- mod)(  and mdjj iUU mod)( +®  in the thi  round, to intercept i mdj iW mod)1/( - and 
i
mdj iW mod)/(
respectively. Then Outsiders are able to figure out =ijw ,mod)( mod)1/(mod)/( pWW i mdji mdj ii --  ),2/)(1( mki j£££  pwr
k
i
i
jj mod1å= =  and finally the share 
js  from jc . In collecting t  shares, the least SPCs to crack, ,_ SPCl  is obviously associated with the relation among ,id t  and .m  
(i) mt =  
As indicated by Theorem 1, to obtain t shares, Outsiders need to crack all kt  (i.e. km ) SPCs involved in the k-round RNS. For example, to 
obtain 5 (i.e. 5== mt ) shares in the 2-round RNS in Figure 2, Outsiders have to break totally 10 SPCs in both rounds.  
(ii) mt <  
In this case, to obtain t shares of t neighbor participants, Outsiders need to first crack continuous 1+t SPCs, jointed by the t  participants, 
in the first round of RNS. And then, they also need to break extra SPCs, connecting the same t  participants, in each of the other 1-k
rounds. Note that there are always 2 SPCs to and from a participant in each round.  
Thus, in the thi ),...,3,2( ki = round with ,mid DÎ the interval of participants’ subscript, the number of SPCs to crack can be divided into 3 sub-
cases. 
(ii-a) if mdt i >+ )( and ,idt > then Outsiders need to crackm SPCs; in this case, 2/mt > holds because of mdt i >+ )( and ,2/mdi < which means 
allm SPCs in this round need to be cracked. 
(ii-b) if mdt i £+ )( and ,idt >  Outsiders need to crack )(2 idtt -- = idt + SPCs because there are totally t2  SPCs, but )( idt -  of them are 
duplicated. 
(ii-c) if mdt i £+ )( and ,idt £  then Outsiders need to break t2 SPCs in the thi round because the t participants have t2 distinct SPCs. 
Actually, the number of SPCs to crack in (ii-b) and (ii-c) can be uniformly expressed as }.,min{ tdt i+ Therefore, if mdt i £+ )( for each ,mid DÎ
the total value of SPCl _ after k rounds is  
                      =SPCl _ å+-+ =
u
i idtukkt 1)(                           (5) 
where u is the number of id in the k-round RNS with .tdi < Note that in (5), ³å+-+ =ui idtukkt 1)(  é ù2/m  holds if 2/)(mk j= and )(/ mmt j³ due to
.1)( 1 ³å+- =ui idtuk That is, there exists 2/)(mk j£  such that =SPCl _ ³å+-+ =ui idtukkt 1)(  é ù2/m  if ).(/ mmt j³  
Obviously, Outsiders have to crack at least m SPCs before obtaining the secret in (i) and (ii-a). Therefore, the least SPCs to crack in case 
1) is at least é ù2/m  for )(/ mmt j³  in k-round RNS. 
 
2) To acquire allm RCs 
As theorem 3 implies, recovering the secret requires allm RCs. Again, we view the tightly coupled group of },...,,{ 110 -= mI UUUmU  as an 
undirected complete graph ),( mmm III EUG = ,where mIE is the set of unordered pairs, i.e., }.,,|),{( kjIkjkjI UUUUUU mm ¹Î= UE  Each unordered pair
),( kj UU is actually the SPC between participants jU and .kU Acquiring all m RCs is equivalent to finding a minimal subset of mIE , 
)(min_
mIsub E , having the least SPCs which connect all participants in .mIU  That is, for any subset of mIE ,
},|),({)( mm IjkkjjkI SPCUUSPCsub EE Î==  connecting all participants in ,mIU we have £|)(min_| mIsub E |)(| mIsub E and Î= jkjkjjI SPCSPCUUm ,|{ !U
)},(min_ mIsub E where |)(min_| mIsub E is the cardinality of ),(min_ mIsub E jkj SPCU ! denotes that jU is either of the 2 participants in jkSPC . 
Since each SPC connects 2 distinct participants and )(min_ mIsub E  contains the least SPCs but connects all m participants, 
msubm mm II =³³+ |||)(min_|21 UE must hold. Specifically, 
ë û{ oddismifm evenismifmsub mI 12/2/|)(min_| +=E , 
that is, |)(min_| mIsub E = é ù2/m , which is obviously the greatest lower bound of SPCs to break in t/2-PCC attack. 
As a result, we know from 1）and 2) that, Outsiders have to crack at least é ù2/m SPCs before recovering the secret in the (t,m,n)-ITOSS 
with k-round RNS for )(/ mmt j³ .                                                                                   o  
                                                                
In practical scenarios, the condition )(/ mmt j³ in Theorem 5 is easy to satisfy because )(/ mm j increases pretty slowly with respect to m. 
For example, 3=t is larger than )(/ mm j for ,103 4££ m and 6=t  satisfies )(/ mmt j³ for .106 8££ m Actually, it hardly happens in practical 
applications that 410  participants simultaneously take part in a secret reconstruction merely with the threshold 3. Moreover, 8106 ££ m  is 
a range sufficiently large for almost all practical applications of secret sharing. The only exception is the case of t=2, in which there are 
only 9 values of m not satisfying )(/ mmt j³  for m<1000, they are m=210, 330, 390, 420, 630, 660, 780, 840 and 990. Even in these cases, 
their least numbers of SPCs to crack, ,_ SPCl  are very close to é ù2/m . For example, 159_ =SPCl and é ù 1652/ =m for m=330, (see Figure 5, 
t=2). 
Compared with traditional (t,n)-SSs in which the secret could be obtained just by cracking é ù2/t  SPCs, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS 
raises the lower bound from é ù2/t to é ù2/m , which is the maximum among all (t,n)-SSs with SPCs among participants. In other words, we 
associate the least number of SPCs to crack with the number of participants instead of the threshold, which implies that the more participants 
are involved, the more robust a (t,m,n)-ITOSS is. 
However, as in most (t,n)-SSs, less than t  shareholders may conspire and try to reconstruct the secret with their shares, Theorem 6 shows 
the security of the scheme against t-1 shareholders conspiring.  
 
Theorem 6.  In the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS, )1( -t shareholders have no information about the secret. 
Proof.  The secret reconstruction in (t,m,n)-ITOSS eventually depends on the Lagrange interpolation polynomial of degree t-1, which is 
the same in nature as Shamir’s (t,n)-SS.  If the dealer chooses the polynomial å= -=10 mod)( ti ii pxaxf and ,ia i=0,1,…,t-1, are uniformly 
selected from pF , we know from [14][25] that )1( -t  shareholders have no information about the secret even if they have )1( -t  shares 
available.                                                                                                    o 
                                            
6. PROPERTIES AND COMPARISONS  
6.1 Properties 
The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme based on polynomial has the following properties. 
 
1) Tightly coupled 
The proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme requires that allm participants form a tightly coupled group by each constructing a RC with the 
share, and the secret is recovered by RCs instead of shares. Moreover, recovering the secret requires allm participants to necessarily hold a 
valid share each and actually take part in secret reconstruction. Otherwise, the secret cannot be recovered. The property of being tightly 
coupled guarantees that an Outsider, without any valid share, is unable to obtain the secret within the tightly coupled group. However, the 
above Outsider may obtain the secret in basic (t,n)-SSs [1, 2, 20, 22, 23] by mounting an IP attack. This property thwarts IP attack without 
verifiable secret sharing. 
2) Unconditionally secure 
Unconditional security [6, 13] means the security of a scheme holds even if adversaries have infinite computing power and storage 
capacity. Apparently, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme is unconditionally secure because it doesn’t depend on any assumption of hard 
problem or one-way function. It is better than most verifiable secret sharing schemes [5, 11, 26, 15, 27], which also aim to prevent Outsiders 
from obtaining the secret but are built on some hard problem such as discrete logarithm problem. 
3) Ideal 
Our scheme obviously conforms to the definition of ideal (t,n)-SS. However, Harn’s scheme [13] and Miao’s scheme [21] are not ideal 
because their shares of each shareholder are all larger than their respective secrets in size. 
4) Highly robust 
In basic (t,n)-SSs [1, 2, 20, 22, 23] and most Verifiable SSs, it is possible for Outsiders to collect t shares and thus recover the secret as 
long as they crack  é ù2/t SPCs among participants. However, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme requires Outsiders to crack at least é ù2/m
SPCs before obtaining the secret if )(/ mmt j³  (i.e. Theorem 5). Therefore, our scheme can substantially improve the robustness against 
t/2-PCC attack when m is much larger than t. 
 
6.2 Comparisons 
The k-round RNS algorithm improves the robustness of our scheme against t/2-PCC attack. Compared with the complete shuffling [18, 
19], it enables (t,m,n)-ITOSS to have the same greatest lower bound of é ù2/m  SPCs to crack but at a much lower communication cost in 
practical scenarios. Compared with the partial shuffling [28], the k-round RNS enables ),,( nmt -ITOSS to raise the lower bound from 
min{ é ù2/m , 1+t } to é ù2/m  only at a slightly higher communication cost.  
Figure 3-5 show comparisons among the 3 private random number selection algorithms, complete shuffling, partial shuffling and our k-
round RNS. 
For different thresholds, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the numbers of participants and messages exchanged among them in 
the 3 algorithms. In the cases of 75,20,2=t with m participants, the complete shuffling needs to exchange 2/)1( -mm messages; the k-round 
RNS needs km  messages, where k  is the least round number such that é ù2/)( 1 mdtukkt ui i ³å+-+ =  holds. At the same time, the partial 
shuffling needsm  messages. Figure 3 also implies that the larger thresholds are, the fewer messages k-round RNS exchanges for given m . 
That is because fewer rounds are required in the group of m participants for the larger threshold. 
 
 
 
 
For fixed numbers of participants, Figure 4 indicates that the k-round RNS exchanges much less messages than the complete shuffling; 
with the increase of ,t  the number of messages in the k-round RNS converges to m, which is equal to that of the partial shuffling. 
Moreover, the larger m is, the slower it converges. That is because, to make SPCl _ in (5) exceed é ù2/m  for a given threshold t, the k-round 
RNS requires more rounds (i.e. a larger k) for more participants (i.e., larger m), and thus more messages (i.e., km messages) need to be 
exchanged. 
 
 
For different thresholds, Figure 5 shows that the partial shuffling has the least SPCs to crack before obtaining the secret, which is 
min{ é ù,2/m 1+t }. That is, a scheme with the partial shuffling is the weakest against t/2-PCC attack. For ,3³t  our k-round RNS and the 
complete shuffling have the same greatest lower bound of SPCs to crack in practical applications, which is é ù2/m , substantially higher than 
that of the partial shuffling when m is much larger than t. It means that the k-round RNS algorithm is capable of enhancing the robustness 
of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost. The only exception is case of t=2, in which lower bounds of SPCs to crack are 
less than but pretty close to é ù2/m  for a few values of m. (see discrete dots in the first sub-figure ) . 
Therefore, k-round RNS raises the robustness of an ideal (t,n)-SS against t/2-PCC attack to the maximum in almost all cases. Moreover, 
it enables the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS to get a good balance between the communication cost and the robustness against t/2-PCC attack. 
   
7. GENERALIZED WAY FROM IDEAL (T,N)-SS TO (T,M,N)-ITOSS 
From Definition 2 to 3, we actually get the method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS scheme into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme.  
According to the definition of an ideal SS [8], the share space and the secret space should be of the same size, and they are the same in 
practice. Therefore, we uniformly use a finite field F , with operators (*, +), to denote the share space iS , secret space S and other related 
domains in ideal (t,n)-SSs, and thus all operations are conducted over F . 
Figure 3. Relationship between messages and participants in 3 algorithms for different thresholds 
Figure 4. Relationship between number of messages and thresholds of the 3 algorithms for different number of participants 
Figure 5. Relationship between the lower bound of SPCs to crack and the number of participants for different thresholds 
Assume that )},Ω(),,({ mm IISRsSG UU is an ideal (t,n)-SS scheme defined in Definition 2, to convert it into )}(),,(),,({ mmm III RCSRRCCsSG CUU W , 
a generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS given by Definition 3, we just need to further divide ),Ω( mm IISR U into 2 algorithms, ),( mm IIRCC UW and )( mIRCSR C . 
1) ),Ω( mm IISR U can be rewritten as )},|({ mImj IjsSR UÎ . During secret reconstruction of ideal SSs, each participant, jU )( mIjU UÎ , first uses 
the share js and all participants mIU to produce a value .jg  It can be described by ),,(' mIjj sg Uh= where FFF ®´ )(:' mh is a function. Then, the 
secret s can be recovered from all }|{ mj Ijg Î by each participant, which can be described by one type of operation, ° , (i.e. + or *) over F . i.e., 
,...})({' 110 -°°°=Î= miiimj gggI|jgs l  ( 10, -££Î mhIi mh ), where FF ®)(:' ml is a function with the operator °over F .  For example, in Shamir’s 
(t,n)-SS, participant jU in mIU (i.e. mIjÎ ), produces =jg pUUUs jiIi jiij m mod)/(,Õ -¹Î and recovers the secret as ,mod pgs mIj jå= Î where js is the 
share of .jU   
2) Before generating a RC in ),( mm IIRCC UW , each participant needs to run the k-round RNS algorithm to pick a private random number. As 
indicated in section 4.2, each participant, ),(, mji IiU j Î obtains a private random number FÎjir such that errr miii =°°° -110 ... holds for ,mj Ii Î  where 
e  is the identity element under the operation °over F . 
3) Then ),( mm IIRCC UW , the Randomized Component Construction algorithm of (t,m,n)-ITOSS, can be further described by the function 'h in
),Ω( mm IISR U of an ideal (t,n)-SS. That is, each participant ),(, mji IiU j Î produces the RC =jic jmj iIi rs °),(' Uh .jj ii rg °=  Thus the RC set of mIU is 
}.,|{ mjiiiiI Iirgcc jjjjm Î°==C  
4) Consequently, )( mIRCSR C , the RC based secret reconstruction algorithm of (t,m,n)-ITOSS, can be expressed by the secret reconstruction 
function FF ®)(:' ml of the ideal (t,n)-SS. i.e., )(' mICl })|({' mjii Iirg jj Î°= l )...()...( 1010 -- °°°°°= mm iiii rrgg .ses =°=    
  
Corollary 1. The above generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS remains ideal. 
Obviously, the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS is ideal because it shares with the ideal (t,n)-SS the same secret and shares over the same finite 
field F , uses the same the secret reconstruction function FF ®)(:' ml .  
 
Theorem 7. The generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS is tightly coupled.  
Proof.  We actually need to prove that the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS conforms to (1). To do this, we first demonstrate that ),(' mj Iis Uh  in 
the ideal (t,n)-SS is a bijection function with respect to
jis , then show that any RC is uniformly distributed over the finite field ,F and finally 
follow the similar procedure in Theorem 3 to prove that the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS is tightly coupled.  
 
1) In the ideal (t,n)-SS, ),Ω( mm IISR U can be viewed as the composite function of 'h and 'l , that is, 
),Ω( mm IISR U })|),('({' mjIi Iis mj Î= Uhl  
),('...),(' 10 mmm IiIi ss UU -°°= hh      (7) 
If ,tm = it follows that ),Ω( tt IISR U })|),('({' tjIi Iis tj Î= Uhl ,),('...),(' 10 sss ttt IiIi =°°= - UU hh  where tIΩ  is a set of t shares. Moreover, since the ideal 
(t,n)-SS is perfect, we have 
)()|( ' sHsH I =W                   (8)  
where 'Ω I is a proper subset of .Ω tI Without the loss of generality, let ='Ω I },...,,{ 210 -tiii sss and },,,...,,{Ω 1210 --= ttt iiiiI ssss  we further have the secret, 
),Ω( tt IISRs U=  
),(')},('...),('{ 111210 ----- °°°= ttttt IiIiIi sss UUU hhh        (9) 
Note that )},('...),('{ 1210 --- °° ttt IiIi ss UU hh is known for given 'Ω I and public .1-tIU Hence, (9) can be simplified as  
                                               ),(' 11 --°= tt Iisas Uh                 (10)  
for some known parameter .FÎa  If we view s and 1-tis as variables in F , the secret s is a function with respect to the share 1-tis . Note that i) s
and 1-tis in (10) have the same domain, i.e., s and 1-tis could be any value in F ; ii) 'h  being a function means there must be a value of  s  
corresponding to a value of
1-tis , and each distinct value of s must be evaluated by a different value of 1-tis . Therefore, we can conclude from 
i) and ii) that 'h is a bijection function with respect to .1-tis  That is, given a and 1-tIU , distinct 1-tis produces a different s  and vice versa. 
Moreover, each share 
1-tis  is uniformly distributed over F  since the secret s is uniformly selected within F . That is, .||/1)()( 1 F==- sPsP ti   
 
2) In the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS, (i) we have
jic jmj iIi rs °= ),(' Uh for any .mj Ii Î  Given mIU , ||/1)( F=jicP follows due to ,r Ri j FÎ
||/1)( F=
jisP and the bijection function 'h over .F That is, jic is uniformly distributed over ,F  so is ,... kj ii cc °° ( 10 -£<£ mkj ), because of the 
properties of finite field .F  Meanwhile, (ii) )( mIRCSR C  indicates })|({')(' mjiI Iic jm Î= ll C 10 ... -°°= mii cc 1100 ... -- °°°°= mm iiii rgrg )...( 10 -°°= mii gg )...( 10 -°°° mii rr
,ses =°= where mIC  is the RC set of )( tmm ³  participants. From (i), (ii) and the proof of theorem 3, if we view pcP ji /1)( =  as ||/1)( F=jicP  
and substitute )(' mIs Cl=  for pcs mIjc j modå= ÎC  in the proof of Theorem 3, it immediately follows that the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS is 
tightly coupled.                                                                                                o  
 
Remark: Theorem 7 implies that the secret s in the generalized (t,m,n)-ITOSS can be recovered only if all m participants have valid shares 
and form a tightly coupled group. Therefore, to figure out the secret, Outsiders have to crack at least é ù2/m SPCs if the k-round RNS algorithm 
is applied.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
Adversaries without valid shares may obtain the secret in a (t,n)-SS by mounting IP or t/2-PCC attack. Ideal (t,n)-SSs are most desirable 
in security and efficiency among most (t,n)-SSs. In order to secure ideal (t,n)-SSs against the 2 attacks, the paper proposed the notion of 
(t,m,n)-ITOSS and presented a polynomial-based scheme as an example. The scheme binds all m participants into a tightly coupled group 
and defeats IP attack in a simpler way than VSS.  In the scheme, we further proposed a k-round RNS algorithm based on Euler’s totient 
function. The k-round RNS enables the scheme to raise the lower bound of SPCs to crack in t/2-PCC attack from é ù2/t to the maximum,
é ù2/m , where m is the number of participants. That is, the proposed (t,m,n)-ITOSS enhances the robustness against t/2-PCC attack to the 
utmost. Moreover, the proposed scheme gets a good balance between the robustness against t/2-PCC attack and communication cost. The 
paper also presented a generalized method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS. 
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